Motivated by extant finance theory predicting that insider trading crowds out private information acquisition by outsiders, we use data for 100 countries for the years 1987 to 2000 to study whether analyst following in a country increases following restriction of insider trading activities. We document that analyst following increases after initial enforcement of insider trading laws. This increase is concentrated in emerging market countries, but is smaller if the country has previously liberalized its capital market. We also find that analyst following responds less intensely to initial enforcement when a country has a pre-existing portfolio of strong investor protections.
Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts' Incentives to Follow Firms
The availability of information is a key determinant of the efficiency of resource allocation decisions in economies and their securities markets. There is, however, considerable crosscountry variation in the quality and quantity of corporate reporting, information intermediation, and information dissemination structures (e.g., Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2003) ). Hence an important research task is to understand why information infrastructures vary and what factors determine their evolution over time.
In this paper we focus on one element of information infrastructure, sell-side analysts.
We exploit cross-country and intertemporal variation in analyst following for 100 countries for the years 1987-2000 to test the hypothesis that analyst following increases upon the restriction of insider trading. Our analysis specifically tests whether analyst following increases following adoption of insider trading legislation and/or the initial act of enforcement of these laws.
This research directly builds on three prior strands of research. The first is theoretical research predicting that insider trading crowds out private information acquisition by outside investors (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and Khanna, Slezak and Bradley (1994) ). In these papers, insiders with free access to information about a firm's payoff reduce trading profits available to outside traders from costly information acquisition. As a result, introducing insiders leads to an equilibrium in which fewer traders acquire private information signals. Consistent with this prediction, Bhattacharya et al. (2000) examine shares trading on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores and provide evidence that these share prices do not react to company news. Their evidence suggests that unrestricted insider trading causes prices to fully incorporate firm-specific information before its public release, thereby limiting the gains to private information acquisition activities. Related research (e.g., Brudney (1979) , Ausubel (1990) and Leland (1992) ), although not specifically addressing information intermediaries, also argues that insider trading generally reduces participation in equity markets. To the extent that sell-side analysts map into the construct of costly information collectors and processors competing for a share of informed trading profits or proxy for equity market participation in general, these theories imply that analyst following will increase after restriction of insider trading activities. Because insider trading research focusing on U.S. markets offers limited opportunities to examine significant changes in insider trading regimes, we employ cross-country panel data on the initial enactment and enforcement of insider trading laws. This country-level research design provides us with a novel opportunity to examine the theory that insider trading crowds out information intermediation.
The second research strand examines responses to changes in insider trading laws.
Closely related to our study, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) document that initial enforcement (but not enactment) of insider trading laws is associated with a significant decrease in countrylevel cost of equity capital. Given this important result, we take the logical next step of investigating potential channels through which insider trading laws act to produce this reduction in the cost of capital. While insider trading restrictions could impact the cost of capital through a number of channels, information intermediation by analysts represents one potentially important channel.
1 Increased analyst activity can reduce the incidence of neglected stocks in portfolio formation (Merton (1987) ), estimation risk (Barry and Brown (1985) ), and/or undiversifiable risk born by uninformed investors due to informed investors being better able to shift portfolio weights to incorporate new information (Easley, O'Hara and Hvidkjaer (2002) and Easley and O'Hara (2003) ). In addition, research has documented smaller bid-ask spreads and greater liquidity for highly followed firms (Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Roulstone (2003) ).
Lastly, our investigation of economy-wide changes in analyst following upon shifts in insider trading legislation and enforcement contributes to the growing literature that examines relations between legal regimes and financial market characteristics (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,
and Levine (2001 Levine ( , 2003 , Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) , La Porta et al. (1997 , 1998 , and Lombardo and Pagano (1999) ).
We document that both the intensity of analyst coverage (average number of analysts covering followed firms within a country) and breadth of coverage (the proportion of domestic listed firms followed by analysts) increase after initial enforcement of insider trading laws. 2 We further find that this increase is concentrated in emerging market countries. These results are robust to inclusion of an array of control variables and rigorous specification checks designed to rule out the possibility that our results simply capture a general upward trend in actual analyst coverage or in reported analyst coverage by I/B/E/S International. 3 In particular, we trend-adjust analyst coverage for each country-year observation using countries that enforced insider trading prior to our sample period as coverage benchmarks, we utilize bootstrap procedures to test the significance of our results, and we re-estimate our main regressions using only the most recent time periods (1992 to 2000) .
It is of course possible that both analyst following and insider trading restrictions are driven by the same correlated omitted variable. We show that our results are robust to several alternative explanations. First, we control for the date of countries' liberalization of their equity market (if they did liberalize). Financial liberalization gives foreign investors the opportunity to invest in domestic markets and domestic investors the right to transact in foreign securities. This is a fundamental national policy decision often enacted simultaneously with other macroeconomic policies. 4 Our results are robust to the inclusion of a liberalization variable.
Moreover, we find that the increase in analyst following after insider trading enforcement is smaller in countries that have already liberalized.
Second, we examine measures of actual financial flows as liberalization may not impact all countries similarly. We include the flow of foreign direct investment into a country to control for the possibility that inflows of foreign capital both draws more analysts and simultaneously pressures governments to crack down on insider trading to please foreign capital providers.
Following Rajan and Zingales (2002) , we also consider a measure of the openness of countries' product markets (imports plus exports scaled by GDP). As product flows increase, the incentives of incumbents to oppose financial development (like insider trading laws) diminishes as they are willing to trade financial development concessions to gain benefits from increased market possibilities. Our results are robust to these controls for the level of foreign direct investment and trade openness.
Finally, we investigate whether the analyst response to changes in insider trading regimes is stronger or weaker when a country already has strong investor protections. We use a country's legal origin to proxy for the level of investor protection (e.g., LaPorta et al. (1998 LaPorta et al. ( , 1999 ), whereby investor protections are presumed stronger in countries with a common law origin relative to countries with either civil law or socialist legal origins. We document that analyst following increases more intensely upon enforcement of insider trading restrictions in countries with civil law or socialist legal origins relative to countries with a common law origin.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses additional pertinent background literature and research design considerations. Section II describes our measures of analyst activity and provides descriptive statistics for regression model variables. Section III presents and discusses the main empirical results of the paper, and section IV concludes.
I. Background and Research Design Considerations
Our main hypothesis is that analyst following increases when insider trading is restricted. In section A, we more fully develop this hypothesis and discuss related research. In section B, we discuss limitations of our data on insider trading activities and define our insider trading enactment and enforcement variables.
A. Do Analysts Map into the Construct of Privately Informed Traders?
A large body of research uses analyst coverage as a proxy for the existence of informed market participants, underlying investor interest, or private information acquisition activities. In general, this research documents that greater analyst following is associated with an improvement in the flow of information into prices. This relation is reflected by a smaller price response to earnings for firms with analyst coverage (Lobo and Mahmoud (1989) ), faster incorporation of common information into price (Brennan, Jegadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) ), more timely prices with respect to future earnings (Ayres and Freeman (2003)), and smaller anomaly-related returns (e.g., momentum (Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) ); value investing strategy (Piotroski (2000) ). Thus, empirical evidence supports the view that analysts provide valuable information to market participants.
However, it is possible that financial analysts do not map into the theoretical construct of investors who gather and trade on private information. For example, Easley, O'Hara and Paperman (1998) argue that analyst following is not a good proxy for information-based trading, and conjecture that the fundamental role of analysts may be to showcase stocks to uninformed investors. Brennan and Subramanyam (1995) and Roulstone (2003) document smaller bid-ask spreads and greater liquidity for firms with higher analyst following, which does not appear consistent with an adverse selection component to the bid-ask spreads driven by analysts possessing significant private information. Also, insider traders and financial analysts may not directly compete over the same information set. For example, Piotroski and Roulstone (2003) document that insider trading increases the relative amount of firm-specific information being impounded into prices, while analyst forecasting activity leads to a greater relative amount of industry and market-level information influencing prices. Thus, if analysts are showcasing devices rather than private information traders, or if analysts focus on disseminating macro-level information while inside traders focus on firm-specific information, a substitute relation between insider trading activities and analyst following may, but need not, exist.
Another possibility is that, even if a substitute relation between insider trading activities and private information collection/analyst following does exist, such a relation need not exist between the adoption/enforcement of insider trading laws and private information collection incentives if the adoption and enforcement of insider trading laws does not significantly reduce insider trading. 5 Consistent with this possibility, Bris (2000) presents evidence that after initial enforcement of insider trading laws, insiders appropriate a larger portion of the total gains in takeover transactions then they did before enforcement. 6 However, if enforcement of insider trading laws has no impact on the extent of insider trading or increases such trading, it is difficult to understand the channels through which such enforcement would change liquidity in the first place.
In the end, the relation between adoption and enforcement of insider trading laws and financial analysts is an empirical question addressed in this paper.
B. Limitations of Insider Trading Data and Variable Definitions
The insider trading data we use is drawn from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) , and consists of the date on which a country adopted insider trading legislation and the date of the initial prosecution under these laws, whether successful or not. They document that at the end of 1998, of 103 countries with existing stock markets, 87 have insider trading laws, while only 38 have enforced these laws. Before 1990, the numbers are 34 and 9. We include their data set in Appendix B.
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A potential limitation of these data is that the adoption and initial enforcement of insider trading restrictions may have a small effect on insider trading activities. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) indicate that they would prefer data on how consistent and intensive insider trading enforcement is in a country; however, they are forced to compromise due to difficulties in extracting this data from countries' regulators.
Specifically, the dates of adoption and enforcement of insider trading restrictions fail to capture substantial differences in the nature of the insider trading laws and related enforcement mechanisms. For example, Maug (1999) isolates important differences in existing insider trading regimes. One important aspect is whether insider trading prosecution is criminal or civil, and the resultant impact the prosecution mechanism has on the legal definition of what constitutes insider trading. Maug (1999) demonstrates that these types of distinctions in insider trading laws can have significant implications for the ultimate impact of insider trading laws on economic welfare. 8 Bris (2000) notes significant differences in insider trading laws across countries relative to who is considered an insider. Estrada and Pena (2001) also document significant differences in the precise details of insider trading laws across 10 European countries.
The task of exploring the underlying details of insider trading laws and enforcement is beyond the scope of this paper.
Despite the apparent limitations of our insider trading data, recent evidence in Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001) suggests that the enforcement date data capture meaningful differences in insider trading regimes around the world. To the extent that these data are noisy measures of the actual curtailment of insider trading activities, we expect the power of our tests to be reduced. In an attempt to deal with this noisy date issue, we assess the statistical significance of observed relations using bootstrapping techniques.
Using the data from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), we define two sets of enactment and enforcement variables. The first set of indicator variables are set equal to 1 in a given country in the years during and after the initial enactment (Exist) or enforcement (Enforce) of insider trading laws, and 0 in all prior years. These indicator variables switch on in the year of the insider trading event, and stay on for the remaining sample years. We use these insider trading regime indicators to document shifts in the level of analyst activity over time. The second set of indicator variables are set equal to 1 in a given country in the year of enactment (∆Exist) or initial enforcement (∆Enforce) of insider trading restrictions, and set equal to 0 in all other years. These indicator variables switch on only in the year of the insider trading event. We use these variables to measure the incremental changes in analyst activities around these insider trading events. This raises two issues. First, it may be the case that non-contributing analysts are following firms in a given country pre-enforcement, and these analysts choose not to become I/B/E/S contributors after insider trading enforcement. To the extent that these analysts increase coverage after initial enforcement, or some analysts initiate coverage after initial enforcement but choose not to contribute to I/B/E/S, this will work against our finding a result as we treat these events as no change in coverage when in fact there was an increase in coverage.
II. Measures of Analyst Activity and Descriptive Statistics for Regression Model Variables
Second, if there exists an increase in analyst coverage as reported by I/B/E/S following enforcement of insider trading laws, we cannot disentangle the extent to which this represents the initiation of new coverage or the decisions of analysts following firms pre-enforcement to become contributors to I/B/E/S post-enforcement. Even though we cannot disentangle them, both decisions represent an escalation in equity market participation by analysts. That is, the enforcement of insider trading laws may create incentives for analysts to follow more firms, or to increase their prominence or prestige in the market by becoming a contributor to I/B/E/S, or for I/B/E/S to expend additional efforts to increase the number of contributors to the database. The fact that these decisions follow the restriction of insider trading is consistent with existing finance theory predicting an increase in equity market participation upon restriction of insider trading (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty (1992) , Khanna, Slezak and Bradley (1994) , Brudney (1979) , Ausubel (1990) and Leland (1992) ).
Another important issue with using I/B/E/S data in our research design is the effect of trends in the data. To convincingly isolate any increase in analyst following after insider trading restrictions, it is necessary to rule out the possibility that our results simply capture a general upward trend in actual analyst coverage or in reported analyst coverage by I/B/E/S International
In our analyses, we take special care to rule out this possibility. As discussed in more detail below, we include variables designed to capture macro effects including growth in GNP, number of firms listed on the domestic exchange, and annual indicator variables. In addition, we trendadjust our analyst coverage metrics for each country-year observation, utilize bootstrap procedures, and re-estimate the primary models using only more recent time periods (1992 to 2000). 
III. Research Design and Empirical Results
This section is organized as follows. Sections A and B presents regressions testing our main hypothesis that analyst following increases upon insider trading law enactment and enforcement, and examines the effect of financial development and financial liberalization on the results. Sections C and D further examine the robustness of our main results. In section C, we estimate separate regressions for emerging markets and developed economies (in contrast to a pooled model using an emerging market dummy). Section D examines the robustness of our results after restricting the sample to the 1992 to 2000 time period. Finally, section E extends the empirical analysis to investigate how changes in analyst following upon insider trading restrictions are impacted by countries' pre-existing levels of investor protections.
A. Baseline Regressions
We combine the dates of adoption and enforcement of insider trading laws from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) B) . 12 As such, these countries exhibit no variation in the treatment variables Enforce or Exist.
Since these countries should not influence our test of changing enforcement regimes, we define trend-adjusted analyst coverage variables as the raw level of coverage in country i, year t (i.e., log(Analyst i,t ) and log(Proport i,t )) less the average level of coverage reported for these six control countries in the same calendar year.
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In addition to the potential for our estimated coefficients to capture trends or macroeffects in the data other than effects associated with insider trading restrictions, GLS p-values could also potentially be biased due to cross-sectional and time-series dependencies in the data.
To test the robustness to these issues of our main result, a positive relation between analyst coverage and Enforce, we bootstrap the statistical significance of our enforcement coefficients using the following procedure.
First, we randomly assign our sample countries into two groups: those countries that did enforce and those countries that did not enforce insider trading restrictions over our sample period. This assignment is in the same proportion as the sample countries in the actual data. For those firms that were randomly chosen to have enforced insider trading restrictions, we next randomly assigned an initial year of enforcement between 1987 and 2000, and define all enforcement indicator variables accordingly. Next, we estimate our multivariate models using these random country-event dates, and retain the estimated coefficients on our enforcement variables. We repeat this random assignment and estimation procedure 500 times, yielding an empirical distribution of enforcement-related coefficients under the null of no relation between insider trading restrictions and analyst coverage. We use this empirical distribution under the null to test the statistical significance of the coefficients from our estimations using the actual panel data. One-tail bootstrap p-values are presented for Enforce in italics and parentheses below our GLS-derived p-values.
In Table II , Panel A, our estimations include four control variables (and year indicators) in addition to the insider trading variables. We include log(GNP) as measure of a country's per capita wealth, and annual growth in real GNP per capita (Growth(GNP)). Results indicate that both measures of analyst following are significantly higher in wealthy countries. We also control for the size of the stock market as measured by the number of domestic firms listed on the home country's exchange, log(Listed), and find analyst following is higher for countries with more listed firms. Finally, we also include an indicator variable Emerge equal to 1 if the country is classified as an emerging market, and 0 otherwise.
[Insert Table II] In terms of insider trading restrictions, our estimations reveal that Exist is either unrelated or significantly negatively related to both measures of analyst following, while Enforce is significantly positively related to both analyst measures in the regression models without interaction variables. Thus, there is a step up in analyst following upon the enforcement of insider trading laws, but no increase upon the enactment of these laws. 14 This result holds using both raw and trend-adjusted data, and is robust to our bootstrap procedures. For Analyst, The second set of estimations presented in Table II , Panel A includes interaction terms to search for a differential response to insider trading laws across emerging and developed markets.
These estimations indicate that the sensitivity of analyst following to the enforcement variable is significantly stronger in emerging markets than developed markets, as reflected by the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term Enforce*Emerge for both analyst following variables (β 8 >0). This result holds using both raw and trend-adjusted data, with bootstrapped pvalues ranging from 0.048 to 0.100.
In these estimations, the coefficient on Enforce (β 6 ) represents the change in analyst following associated with the initial enforcement of insider trading restrictions in the subsample of developed countries, after controlling for other country-level attributes and global year effects.
This coefficient is not significantly greater than zero for either analyst measure. In contrast, the coefficient on Enforce for the subsample of emerging market countries, which is represented by the sum β 6 + β 8 (i.e., the coefficient on Enforce plus the interaction term Enforce*Emerge) is significantly positive at the one percent level for both measures of analyst coverage. 15 This statistical significance is indicated by the superscript "a" on the coefficient on Enforce*Emerge. 16 Similarly, the superscript "a" on the bootstrapped p-values for Enforce*Emerge indicates that the same significance level is achieved for the sum β 6 + β 8 using our empirically derived distribution of coefficients. Together, this evidence suggests the enforcement effect is concentrated in emerging market countries. The results in Table II , Panel B reveal that both measures of analyst following are significantly higher in years following financial market liberalization. However, even after controlling for liberalization, Enforce remains significantly positively related to both analyst measures (both raw and trend-adjusted data, using both GLS and bootstrap-derived p-values).
After adding interaction terms, we find a significant negative relation between Exist and both measures of analyst following for the subsample of unliberalized countries (β 6 <0). In contrast, for the subsample of liberalized countries, the relation between Exist and analyst following (i.e., β 6 + β 8 ) is positive for both measures of analyst following, and significantly greater than zero for Analyst. In terms of enforcement effects, the relation between Enforce and both measures of analyst following is significantly greater than zero for the non-liberalized subsample (i.e., β 7 >0). However, this effect is significantly lower for liberalized countries (β 9 <0), yet the net effect is still marginally positive (i.e., β 7 +β 9 >0). These results hold for raw and trend-adjusted data, and are robust to our bootstrap procedures.
As defined, our liberalization variable measures the year that a country implements financial market liberalization policies. However, actual financial flows resulting from the act of liberalization may be the true cause of both insider trading restrictions and analyst following, and these flow responses can vary significantly across countries due to country characteristics that we have not controlled for. To mitigate concerns about the issue of correlated omitted variables, we re-estimate our models after including two direct measures of country level financial flows:
foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade openness (Open). We find that our main results are robust to the inclusion of foreign direct investment and trade openness.
To summarize, Table II This evidence is consistent with a conjecture by Laeven and Perotti (2001) who argue that announced market-oriented policies may be subsequently reversed and so are not initially credible. They find that sustained progress in privatization gradually leads to increased public confidence, which in turn has a strong effect on market development. In emerging markets, enforcement of insider trading restrictions may signal political commitment and encourage market participants, like analysts, to transition to a new property rights regime, where they are skeptical at the time of enactment. Similarly, in countries that have already liberalized, enactment of insider trading laws may have relatively more credibility, supporting a strong analyst response at that time and diminishing the importance of initial enforcement as a signal of commitment to change.
B. Change in Analyst Activity in the Year of Enactment and Enforcement
To reinforce the preceding inferences, we estimate regressions focusing on annual changes in analyst activity around our insider trading events. The variable measuring change in existence of insider trading laws in a given country (∆Exist) is set equal to 1 in the year in which the insider trading laws were enacted in that country, and is set equal to 0 in all other years.
Similarly, the variable measuring change in the enforcement regime (∆Enforce) is set equal to 1 for a given country in the year of the initial enforcement of insider trading laws, and set equal to 0 in all other years. This change regression model specification represents a test of whether the change in analyst activity is higher in the year the insider trading laws were enacted or enforced relative to the surrounding years.
[Insert Table III]   Table III , Panel A presents descriptive statistics on annual changes in analyst coverage over our sample period. Specifically, the average annual change in number of analysts following covered firms in a country is 0.188 analysts per firm, while the average annual change in the proportion of firms in the country being covered is 0.008. This increase in analyst coverage is consistent with the observed growth in capital markets over this time frame. In terms of observed insider trading events, we find that 54 countries enacted insider trading restrictions between 1987 and 2000, while 30 countries initially enforced these laws. The results are consistent with the inferences drawn from the levels regressions reported in Table II indicating a positive relation between change in analyst following and the enforcement of insider trading restrictions. Before considering interactions, we find that ∆Analyst is significantly higher in the year of initial enforcement of insider trading laws, although we do not find a significant relation between the change in breadth of analyst following (∆Proport) and ∆Enforce. Also consistent with Table II , for both ∆Analyst and ∆Proport, the interaction terms show that the increase in analyst following upon enforcement is significantly higher in emerging market countries and significantly lower in countries that have already liberalized their markets. These results hold for raw and trend-adjusted data, and after implementing our bootstrapping procedures. Finally, none of the coefficients on ∆Exist or on the interactions of ∆Exist with Emerge or with Liberal are significant. These results fail to provide any evidence that the change in analyst following in the year that insider trading laws are enacted is higher than in other years.
C. Separate Regressions for Emerging Markets and Developed Economies
In Table IV , we estimate separate regressions for emerging markets and developed economies, in contrast to our use of an emerging market dummy (Emerge) in Tables II and III. Panel A reports results from levels regressions and panel B reports results from a changes specification. This analysis extends Tables II and III in several important respects.
First, this partition of the sample allows us to more cleanly isolate the impact of liberalization. In particular, note (from Appendix B) that all developed countries liberalized their markets prior to 1987, implying that all liberalization events during our sample window relate to emerging market countries. Second, this specification allows us to split our control countries into separate developed and emerging market benchmarks when trend-adjusting our analyst coverage data. Specifically, we measure average analyst coverage each year for the respective set of developed or emerging market control countries to create trend-adjustments by type of economy, and match accordingly. 18 Finally, by estimating these models separately, we are allowing the coefficients on all country-level control variables and annual indicators to vary across these two fundamentally different sets of countries.
[Insert Table IV] The evidence in Table IV 
D. Estimations Utilizing Country-Year Observations between 1992 and 2000
To further rule out the possibility that our results simply capture trends in the data, we reestimate our primary tests restricting the analysis to the sample period 1992 to 2000. These estimations are a response to the possibility that I/B/E/S has increased its efforts to be a more comprehensive data source in recent time periods. We choose 1992 to start the restricted sample period as in 1992 I/B/E/S significantly expanded both U.S. and international coverage. 19 These estimations are presented in Table V. [Insert Table V Although these change results are weaker, they are still generally supportive of our hypothesis.
In the estimations without interactions, the coefficient on ∆Enforce is positive and significant for ∆Analyst, but not for ∆Proport. In the estimations with our Emerge interactions, the enforcement effect is positive and significant in emerging markets for ∆Proport, but not for ∆Analyst. Finally, for both analyst variables, the coefficient on enforcement is significantly greater than zero in countries that have not liberalized, and significantly lower in countries that have liberalized relative to those that have not.
E. Investor Protection Levels and the Impact of Insider Trading Enforcement on Analysts
In our final empirical analysis, we investigate whether the change in analyst following is larger or smaller when a country already has strong investor protections. We use a country's legal origin to proxy for the level of investor protection in a country (e.g., LaPorta et al. (1998) ).
We classify countries according to whether their legal origin is primarily common law (English origin), civil law (French, German, or Scandinavian origin), or socialist (Soviet Union origin), by including an indicator for civil law (Civillaw) and socialist origin (Socialist) (data source: La Porta et al. (1999) ). La Porta et al. (1999) conjecture that countries with socialist origin have the most interventionist governments, next come countries with civil laws, and finally common law countries. We posit the same ordering for investor protection, with common law countries posited to have the best investor protections (LaPorta et al. (1998) ).
[Insert Table VI] Descriptive statistics for our two legal origin variables are presented in Table I . Table VI presents coefficients from our baseline estimations after including these legal origin variables.
Table VI documents that the enactment of insider laws in socialist countries is associated with a significant increase in analyst following. Moreover, the estimations shows that our main results are robust to inclusion of legal origin. Without interactions, the coefficient on Enforce is positive and significant for both analyst measures. From the interaction analysis, we see that the increase in analyst following (both Analyst and Proport) upon insider trading enforcement is significantly higher in both civil law and socialist origin countries relative to common law countries. These results are consistent with diminishing returns to investor protections. That is, the enforcement of insider trading restrictions in common law countries, which presumably have relatively high levels of pre-existing investor protections, is associated with a smaller increase in analyst following than in civil and socialist origin countries.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
We exploit cross-country and intertemporal variation in analyst following for 100 countries for the years 1987 to 2000 to test the hypothesis that analyst following increases upon the restriction of insider trading. Our main analysis tests whether analyst following increases following adoption of insider trading legislation and/or the initial enforcement of these laws.
We present evidence that analyst following as reported by I/B/E/S International increases upon initial enforcement of insider trading restrictions. We find that this increase is concentrated in emerging market countries. We find only modest evidence of a reaction around enactment of laws. These results hold in both levels and change specifications and are robust to inclusion of an array of control variables and rigorous specification checks. We take special care
to rule out the possibility that our results simply capture a general upward trend in actual analyst coverage or in reported analyst coverage by I/B/E/S International. In particular, we trend-adjust analyst coverage for each country year using countries that enforced insider trading prior to our sample period as baseline countries, utilize bootstrapping procedures to test the statistical significance of our primary results, and re-estimated the main regressions using only more recent (Fishman and Hagerty (1992) , Khanna, Slezak and Bradley (1994) , Bhattacharya et al. (2000) , Brudney (1979) , Ausubel (1990) and Leland (1992) Our results also add to the growing body of evidence that financial development and legal regimes are intricately linked (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001 Levine ( , 2003 , Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998 ), La Porta et al. (1997 , 1998 , and Lombardo and Pagano (1999) ).
We investigate whether analyst following increases more or less upon a shift in the insider trading regime in countries that already have strong investor protections, as measured by common law legal origin. We document that the increase in analyst following upon enforcement of insider trading restrictions is significantly higher in both civil law and socialist origin countries relative to common law countries. We also find a significant increase in analyst following upon enactment of insider trading laws in socialist countries. These results are consistent with diminishing returns to investor protections.
In conclusion, we believe that this cross-country, panel-based evidence of a positive relation between analyst following and insider trading restrictions is interesting, especially given the predictions of the crowding out theory and recent empirical evidence by Bhattacharya and
Daouk (2002) 
The models are estimated on a panel of countries with a maximum of 14 time-series observations (calendar years 1987 through 2000) using a pooled GLS estimation technique with annual indicator variables (Y t ). Trend-adjusted data is defined as the raw level of analyst coverage in country i, year t less the average level of coverage reported for six countries that enforced insider trading restrictions prior to 1987 in the same calendar year. + β1log(GNPi,t-1) + β2Growth(GNPi,t) + β3∆log(Listedi,t) + β4Emergei,t + β5Liberali,t + β6∆Existi,t + β7∆Enforcei,t + β8∆Existi,t*Emergei,t + β9∆Enforcei,t*Emergei,t + β10∆Existi,t*Liberali,t + β11∆Enforcei,t*Liberali,t + εi,t
The models are estimated on a panel of countries with a minimum (maximum) of two (thirteen) time-series observations (i.e., annual changes between calendar years 1987 through 2000) using a pooled GLS estimation technique with annual indicator variables (Y t ). All models are estimated using trend-adjusted analyst coverage data. a,b,c The sum of coefficients on ∆Exist and ∆Enforce for emerging market countries (i.e., β 6 +β 8 and β 7 +β 9 ) and liberalized countries (i.e., β 6 +β 10 and β 7 +β 11 ) are significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten-percent level, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. (1) . All models estimated using a pooled GLS estimation technique with annual indicator variables (Y t ). All models are estimated using trend-adjusted analyst coverage data. Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The superscripts "a" and "b" denote that the sum of coefficients on Exist and Enforce for emerging market countries (i.e., β 5 +β 7 and β 6 +β 8 ) are significantly different than zero at the one and five-percent level, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. The superscripts "c" and "d" denote that the sum of coefficients on Exist and Enforce for liberalized market countries (i.e., β 6 +β 8 and β 7 +β 9 ) are significantly different than zero at the one and five-percent level, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. = The amount of foreign direct investment in country i during calendar year t, scaled by the country's gross domestic product.
World Development Indicators Open i,t
= Trade openness, measured as the sum of total imports and exports for country i in calendar year t, scaled by the country's gross domestic product.
World Development Indicators

